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The central core of many industrial companies is the process of production and 
distribution.  A recurring problem is to match the production rate to the rate of final 
consumer sales.  It is well known that factory production rate often fluctuates more 
widely than does the actual consumer purchase rate.  It has often been observed that a 
distribution system of cascaded inventories and ordering procedures seems to amplify 
small disturbances that occur at the retail level...  How does the system create 
amplification of small retail sales changes?...  [W]e shall see that typical 
manufacturing and distribution practices can generate the types of business 
disturbances which are often blamed on conditions outside the company. 
—Jay W. Forrester (Industrial Dynamics, 1961, p. 22) 
 
A. Overview 
The purpose of a supply chain is to provide the right output at the right time.  As customer 
requirements change, the managers of the supply chain respond by adjusting the rate at which 
resources are ordered and used.  Supply chains are thus governed primarily by negative 
feedback.  Because supply chains typically involve substantial time delays, they are prone to 
oscillation—production and inventories chronically overshoot and undershoot the appropriate 
levels.  Figure 1 shows industrial production in the US for consumer goods and materials since 
1950.  The data are detrended (the long-run growth rate of manufacturing output since 1950 is 
about 3.2%/year).  The data reveal three important features: 
1.  Oscillation:  Production fluctuates significantly around the growth trend.  The 
dominant periodicity is the business cycle, a cycle of prosperity and recession averaging 
about 4.5 years in duration, but exhibiting considerable variability.1   
2.  Amplification:  The amplitude of the fluctuations in materials production (upstream in 
                                                 
1 The NBER, official arbiter of business cycle timing in the US, reports an average peak-to-peak cycle duration of 
56.4 months over 33 cycles from 1854 through 2009, with a standard deviation of 28.5 months and a range from 17 
to 128 months (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). 
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the supply chain compared to consumer goods) is significantly greater than that in 
consumer goods production.  For example, the standard deviation of the fractional rates 
of change in monthly output is 11.7%/year for consumer goods, but 17.6%/year for 
materials, some 150% greater.2   
3.  Phase lag:  The peaks and troughs of the cycle in materials production tend to lag 
behind those in production of consumer goods.   
 
 
These three features, oscillation, amplification, and phase lag, are pervasive in supply chains.  
Typically, the amplitude of fluctuations increases as they propagate from the customer to the 
supplier, with each upstream stage in a supply chain tending to lag behind its immediate 
customer. 
The amplification of fluctuations from consumption to production is even greater in specific 
industries.  The top panel in Figure 2 shows the petroleum supply chain (the figure shows the 
annualized growth rate; the graph shows 12-month centered moving averages to filter out the 
high-frequency month-to-month noise).   
 
                                                 
2 Standard deviation in annualized rate of change in the seasonally adjusted monthly data.  
 
 
Figure 1  Oscillation, amplification, and phase lag in the aggregate supply chain 
Source:  US Federal Reserve, series B51000 and B53000, Jan 1950-August 2013.  The trend is 
the best exponential growth fit to each series. 
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Figure 2  Amplification in supply chains 
Top:  Oil and gas production and drilling activity, US.  
Bottom:  Semiconductor production compared to industrial production, US   
Graphs show 12-month centered moving averages of the annualized fractional growth rates 
calculated from the seasonally adjusted monthly data.   
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The amplification is substantial:  drilling activity fluctuates about three times more than 
production, imposing large boom and bust cycles on the suppliers of drill rigs and equipment.  
The bottom panel shows the semiconductor industry.  Semiconductor production is at the 
upstream end of the supply chain for electronic equipment and fluctuates far more than industrial 
production as a whole.  Other industries show similar amplification within their supply chains, 
including machine tools (Anderson, Fine, & Parker 2000, Sterman 2000).  
A central question in operations management is whether the oscillations, amplification and 
phase lag observed in supply chains arise as the result of operational or behavioral causes.  
Operational theories assume that decision makers are rational agents who make optimal 
decisions given their local incentives and information.  Supply chain instability must then result 
from the interaction of rational actors with the physical and institutional structure of the system.  
Physical structure includes the network linking customers and suppliers and the placement of 
inventories and buffers within it, along with capacity constraints and time delays in production, 
order fulfillment, transportation, and so on.  Institutional structure includes the degree of 
horizontal and vertical coordination and competition among firms, the availability of information 
to decision makers in each organization, and the incentives faced by each decision maker.  
Behavioral explanations also capture the physical and institutional structure of supply chains, 
but view decision makers as boundedly rational actors with imperfect mental models, actors who 
use heuristics to make ordering, production, capacity acquisition, pricing and other decisions 
(Morecroft 1985, Sterman 2000, Boudreau et al. 2003, Gino & Pisano 2008, Bendoly et al. 2010, 
Croson et al. 2013).  These heuristics may yield excellent or suboptimal results depending on 
how well they capture the complexity of the situation (Simon 1969, 1982).   Behavioral theories 
also recognize the errors and biases that often arise in judgment and decision making (e.g., 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky 1982).  Behavioral explanations also recognize that situational 
factors such as time pressure and poverty consume scarce cognitive resources that can lead to 
poor decisions (Shah, Mullainathan, & Shafir 2012) and that decisions made in conditions of 
stress can be strongly conditioned by fear, anger, and other psychophysiological reactions (Lo & 
Repin 2002, Rudolph & Repenning 2002).  
To illustrate the difference between operational and behavioral theories, consider a simple 
supply chain with a single producer servicing two competing retailers.  If there is an unexpected 
increase in final demand, both retailers will place additional orders with the supplier.  If those 
orders exceed the supplier’s capacity, then the product will be placed on allocation—each retailer 
 5 
receives only a fraction of what they desire.  In that case, rational retailers might respond 
strategically by ordering more than they actually want in hopes of gaining a larger share of the 
total available shipments from the supplier, leading to what Sterman (2000) calls “phantom 
orders.”  The result would be amplification of the change in final demand, or even a demand 
bubble (Lee et al. 1997, Cachon & Lariviere 1999, Armony & Plambeck 2005). Alternatively, 
retailers might use behavioral decision rules such as “order more whenever there is scarcity” or 
even suffer from emotional overreactions leading to hoarding inventory as deliveries fall.  Such 
heuristics and emotional reactions would also lead to amplification of final demand even though 
the retailers are not behaving rationally (e.g., Sterman & Dogan 2014).  
The difference matters:  if supply chain instability arises from operational factors and rational 
behavior, then policies must be directed at changing the physical and institutional structure of the 
system, including incentives.  If, however, instability arises from bounded rationality and 
emotional arousal such policies may not be sufficient.  To illustrate, shortages of gasoline have 
sometimes caused retail service stations to run out, leading to “Sorry—No Gas” signs; episodes 
include the 1979 gas crisis in the US, transport strikes in Europe in 2000, and the aftermath of 
Superstorm Sandy in 2012 on the east coast of the US.  In each case, gas shortages led to long 
lines as people queued, often for hours, in an attempt to top off their tanks.  For example, after 
Superstorm Sandy,  
“… drivers waited in lines that ran hundreds of vehicles deep, requiring state troopers and local police to 
protect against exploding tempers.  
 … The lines themselves only exacerbated the problem; reports in the local media provoked drivers to 
buy gasoline before stations ran out. Some spent what fuel they had searching for more and could be seen 
pushing vehicles toward relief. 
 ‘I just want to have it, because you don’t know how long this is going to last,’ said Richard Bianchi, 
waiting in the half-mile line at the Sunoco in Union [New Jersey] with a tank that was three-quarters full. 
 ‘People are panicking,’ said Jimmy Qawasmi, the owner of a Mobil in the Westchester County town of 
Mamaroneck.”3 
If such behavior is rational, then policies that alter the institutional structure and incentives 
such as maximum purchases or odd-even rules (limiting people to purchases every other day 
based on the last digit of their license plates) should reduce demand and ease the shortage.  If 
hoarding is a behavioral and emotional response to scarcity, then these actions may worsen the 
situation by reinforcing people’s belief that there really is a shortage and increasing the number 
of people who queue even when their tanks are nearly full.  Of course any situation may involve 
                                                 
3 New York Times, 2 November 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/nyregion/gasoline-shortages-
disrupting-recovery-from-hurricane.html. 
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a mix of strategic, rational action and behavioral, emotional responses.  
In this chapter I show how supply chain instability, including oscillation, amplification and 
phase lag, arise from the interaction of the basic physics of supply chains with behavioral 
decision processes.  Amplification and phase lag arise from the presence of basic physical 
structures including stocks of inventory and delays in adjusting production or deliveries to 
changes in incoming orders.  Oscillations, however, are not inevitable.  They arise from 
boundedly rational, behavioral decision processes.  Experimental studies show, furthermore, that 
supply chain instability, including oscillation, amplification and phase lag, along with demand 
bubble, hoarding, and phantom ordering, arise even in experimental settings in which there are 
no operational factors that might make such behavior rational.  I also present two learning 
activities that can be used effectively to teach principles of supply chains.  The Manufacturing 
Case (Booth Sweeney & Sterman 2000) is a simple paper-and-pencil exercise that tests 
participants’ understanding of time delay in a simple inventory management setting, and 
explores the origin of amplification and phase lag.  The Beer Distribution Game (Sterman 
1989a) is a role-play simulation of a simple supply chain and is widely used to teach principles 
of operations management, system dynamics and systems thinking.  
 
B. Theoretical Perspective 
Supply chains consist of cascades of firms, each receiving orders and adjusting production and 
production capacity to meet changes in demand.  Each link in a supply chain maintains and 
controls inventories of materials and finished product.  To understand the behavior of a supply 
chain and the causes of oscillation, amplification, and phase lag, it is first necessary to 
understand the structure and dynamics of a single link; that is, how an individual firm manages 
its inventories and resources as it attempts to balance production with orders.  Such balancing 
processes always involve negative feedbacks 
The Stock Management Problem: Structure  
All negative feedback processes involve comparing the state of the system to the desired 
state, then initiating a corrective action to eliminate any discrepancy.  In such a stock 
management task, the manager seeks to maintain a stock (the state of the system) at a particular 
target level, or at least within an acceptable range.  Stocks are altered only by changes in their 
inflow and outflow rates.  Typically, the manager must set the inflow rate to compensate for 
losses and usage, and to counteract disturbances that push the stock away from its desired value.  
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Often there are lags between the initiation of a control action and its effect and lags between a 
change in the stock and the perception of that change by the decision maker.  The duration of 
these lags may vary and may be influenced by the manager’s own actions.   
Stock management problems occur at many levels of aggregation.  At the level of a firm, 
managers must order parts and raw materials to maintain inventories sufficient for production to 
proceed at the desired rate.  They must adjust for variations in the usage of these materials and 
for changes in their delivery delays.  At the individual level, you regulate the temperature of the 
water in your morning shower, guide your car down the highway, and manage your checking 
account balances.  At the macroeconomic level, central banks like the US Federal Reserve seek 
to manage the stock of money to stimulate economic growth and avoid inflation, while 
compensating for variations in credit demand, budget deficits, and international capital flows. 
The stock management control problem can be divided into two parts: (1) the stock and flow 
structure of the system and (2) the decision rules managers use to order and produce new units 
(Figure 3).   
The stock to be controlled, S, accumulates the acquisition rate AR less the loss rate LR: 
 ܵ௧ ൌ 		 ׬ ሺܣܴ െ ܮܴሻ݀ݏ ൅	ܵ௧బ௧௧బ  (1) 
Losses include any outflow from the stock.  Losses may arise from usage (as in a raw material 
inventory) or decay (as in the depreciation of plant and equipment).  The loss rate must depend 
on the stock itself—losses must approach zero as the stock is depleted—and may also depend on 
other endogenous variables,X, and exogenous variables, U.  Losses may be nonlinear and may 
depend on the age distribution of the stock, captured by a loss rate function: 
 ܮܴ ൌ ௅݂ோሺܵ, ܺ, ܷሻ (2)  
In general, managers cannot add new units to a stock simply because they desire to do so.  
Typically there are delays in acquiring new units, creating a supply line of orders that have been 
placed but not yet received:  A firm seeking to increase its capital stock cannot acquire new units 
immediately but must await construction or delivery.  New workers cannot be hired and trained 
instantly.  It takes time for your car to stop after you step on the brakes, and it takes time for the 
economy to respond after the Federal Reserve changes interest rates.   The supply line 
accumulates orders less the rate at which units are completed and enter the stock: 
 ܵܮ௧ ൌ 		 ׬ ሺܱܴ െ ܣܴሻ݀ݏ ൅	ܵܮ௧బ௧௧బ  (3)  
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Figure 3  The generic stock management structure 
The determinants of the desired supply line are not shown (see text). 
 
  
Indicated
Orders
IO
Adjustment
for Supply Line
ASL
Desired
Supply Line
SL* Adjustment
for Stock
AS
Desired
Stock
S*
Expected
Loss Rate
Le
+
+
+
+-
-
+Desired
Acquisition
Rate
AR* +
+
+
Stock
Adjustment Time
S
Supply Line
Adjustment Time
SL
- -
Stock
S
Order Rate
OR
-
Acquisition
Rate
AR
Loss Rate
LR
Acquisition
Lag

Other
Endogenous
Variables
X
Exogenous
Variables
U
++
+
B
Supply Line
Control
Stock
Control
Stock and Flow
Structure
Supply Line
SL
Decision Rule
B
 9 
The acquisition rate depends on the supply line SL of units that have been ordered but not yet 
received and the average acquisition lag, ߣ: 
 ܣܴ ൌ ࣦሺܵܮ, ߣሻ  (4)  
  ߣ ൌ ఒ݂ሺܵܮ, ࢄ, ࢁሻ  (5)  
where the lag operator ࣦሺܵܮ, ߣሻ denotes a material delay or distributed lag in which acquisitions 
lag orders with a mean delay of  time units (Sterman 2000, Ch. 11).   
In general, the acquisition lag is a variable that depends on the supply line itself and on the 
other endogenous and exogenous variables.  For example, the acquisition rate is typically 
capacitated:  production depends on the plant, equipment, labor and other resources of the firm; 
deliveries from a supplier depend on the supplier’s inventory and transportation capacity; 
construction of new buildings depends on the capacity of the construction industry in the region, 
and so on.  Consider the recovery of the housing industry from the great recession of 2007.  
During the downturn, housing starts and the supply line of homes under construction were very 
small.  Homes could be built quickly because labor and equipment were abundant.  The 
acquisition lag would be at or below normal.  As housing starts recover, the acquisition lag 
would remain near the normal value until construction activity nears the capacity of the 
construction industry.  Once capacity is fully utilized, the acquisition lag increases as the supply 
line rises relative to the acquisition rate.  The acquisition lag can also be influenced by 
managerial decisions, as when a firm chooses to expedite delivery of materials by paying 
premium freight or speeding production by use of overtime and extra shifts.   
The structure represented by Figure 3 is quite general.  The system may be nonlinear.  There 
may be arbitrarily complex feedbacks among the endogenous variables, and the system may be 
influenced by a number of exogenous forces, both systematic and stochastic.  The delay in 
acquiring new units is often variable and may be constrained by the capacity of the supplier.  
Table 1 maps common examples into the generic form.  In each case, the manager must choose 
the order rate over time to keep the stock close to a target.  Note that most of these systems tend 
to generate oscillation and instability.  The structure can be applied to systems from management 
to medicine and beyond.  As an example, McCarthy et al. (2014) develop a system dynamics 
model to improve treatment of long-term hemodialysis patients suffering from anemia.  The 
model captures the time delays between treatments with erythropoeisis-stimulating agents and 
changes in hemoglobin levels, showing how a new treatment protocol stabilizes hemoglobin 
levels, leading to better patient outcomes and lower treatment costs. 
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System Stock Supply Line Loss Rate Acquisition Rate Order Rate Typical Behavior 
Inventory 
management 
Inventory Goods on order Shipments to 
customers 
Arrivals from 
supplier 
Orders for goods Business cycles 
Capital investment Capital plant Plant under 
construction 
Depreciation Construction 
completion 
New contracts Construction 
cycles 
Equipment Equipment Equipment on 
order 
Depreciation Equipment 
delivery 
New equipment 
orders 
Business cycles 
Human resources Employees Vacancies & 
trainees 
Layoffs and quits Hiring rate Vacancy creation Business cycles 
Cash 
management 
Cash balance Accounts 
Receivable 
Expenditures Payments 
received from 
customers 
Bills issues to 
customers 
Fluctuations in 
cash flow and 
account balances 
Marketing Customer base Prospective 
customers 
Defections to 
competitors 
Recruitment of 
new customers 
New customer 
contacts 
Boom and bust in 
customer base 
Hog farming Hog stock Immature and 
gestating hogs  
Slaughter rate Maturation rate Breeding rate The “hog cycle” 
Agricultural 
commodities 
Inventory Crops in the field Consumption Harvest rate Planting rate Commodity cycles 
Commercial real 
estate 
Building stock Buildings under 
development 
Depreciation Completion rate Development rate Real estate 
booms and busts 
Cooking on 
electric range 
Temperature of 
pot 
Heat in coils of 
range 
Diffusion to air Diffusion from 
coils to pot 
Setting of burner Overcooked 
dinner 
Driving Distance to next 
car 
Momentum of car Friction/drag Velocity Gas and brake 
pedals 
Stop-and-go traffic 
Showering Water 
temperature 
Water temp. in 
pipes 
Drain rate Flow from 
showerhead 
Faucet settings Freeze-then-burn 
Blood sugar 
regulation 
Glucose in 
bloodstream 
Sugar and starch 
in GI tract 
Metabolism Digestion Food consumption Cycles of energy 
level 
Social drinking Alcohol in blood Alcohol in 
stomach 
Metabolism of 
alcohol 
Diffusion from 
stomach to blood 
Alcohol 
consumption rate 
Drunkenness 
Table 1 Examples of the stock management structure 
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Turning to the decision rule, the formulation for orders captures the decision-making process 
of the managers.  Following the principles outlined by Sterman (2000, Ch. 13), such 
formulations must be based only on information actually available to the decision makers, must 
be robust under extreme conditions, and must be consistent with knowledge of the actual 
decision-making process, even if the way people actually make decisions is less than optimal.  In 
most stock management situations the complexity of the feedbacks among the variables makes it 
impossible to determine the optimal strategy.  Instead, people use heuristics or rules of thumb to 
determine the order rate.  The ordering decision rule proposed here assumes that managers, 
unable to optimize, instead exercise control through a locally rational heuristic.  The model thus 
falls firmly in the tradition of bounded rationality and the behavioral theory of the firm pioneered 
by Simon (1982) and Cyert and March (1963). 
Three considerations are fundamental to any decision rule for orders.  First, managers should 
replace expected losses from the stock.  Second, managers should reduce the discrepancy 
between the desired and actual stock by ordering more than expected losses when the stock is 
less than desired and less than expected losses when there is a surplus.  Third, managers should 
pay attention to the supply line of unfilled orders, and adjust orders to eliminate any 
discrepancies between the desired and actual supply line. 
To formalize this intuition, first note that the order rate in most real life situations must be 
nonnegative: 
 ܱܴ ൌ ܯܣܺሺ0, ܫܱሻ  (6)  
where IO is the indicated order rate, the rate indicated by other pressures.  Order cancellations 
are sometimes possible and may sometimes exceed new orders.  The costs of, and administrative 
procedures for, cancellations are likely to differ from those for new orders.  Cancellations, if 
possible, should therefore be modeled as a distinct outflow from the supply line, governed by a 
separate decision rule, rather than as negative orders (Sterman 2000, Ch. 19 provides a suitable 
formulation). 
The indicated order rate is formulated as an anchoring and adjustment process (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1974).  Managers are assumed to base orders on the desired acquisition rate, ܣܴ∗, 
which is the rate at which they would like to add items to the stock.  Managers then adjust orders 
above or below the desired acquisition rate by an amount designed to bring the supply line of 
unfilled orders in line with its goal (the Adjustment for the Supply Line, ASL): 
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  ܫܱ ൌ ܣܴ∗ ൅ ܣௌ௅  (7)  
The desired acquisition rate is similarly formulated as an anchoring and adjustment process.  
Managers seek to replace expected losses, ܮ௘, modified by an amount designed to bring the stock 
in line with its goal (the Adjustment for the Stock, AS): 
 ܣܴ∗ ൌ ܮ௘ ൅ ܣௌ  (8)  
Why does the desired acquisition rate depend on expected losses rather than the actual loss 
rate?  The current value of a flow represents the instantaneous rate of change.  Actual 
instruments and information systems, however, cannot measure instantaneous rates of change but 
only average rates over some finite interval.  The velocity of an object is calculated by measuring 
how far it moves over some period of time and taking the ratio of the distance covered to the 
time interval.  The result is the average speed over the interval.  The actual speed throughout the 
interval can vary, and the velocity at the finish line may differ from average.  Similarly, the sales 
rate of a company right now cannot be measured.  Instead sales rates are estimated by 
accumulating total sales over some interval of time such as an hour, day, week, month, or 
quarter.  The reported sales rate is the average over the reporting interval, and sales at the end of 
the period may differ from the average over the interval.  No matter how accurate the 
instruments, the rate of change measured and reported to an observer always differs from the 
instantaneous rate of change.   
While in principle all flows are measured and reported with a delay, in practice the delay is 
sometimes so short relative to the dynamics of interest that it can safely be omitted.  If the loss 
rate is directly observable by the decision maker with essentially no delay or measurement error 
it can be acceptable to assume ܮ௘ is the actual loss rate.  Most often, however, the loss rate is not 
directly observable and must be estimated, introducing measurement, reporting, and perception 
delays.  Further, even if losses are reported frequently, with little lag, it may be necessary or 
desirable to filter and smooth those data.  For example, most manufacturing firms do not use raw 
order or shipment data as direct inputs to orders for materials or the production start rate.  Orders 
and shipments are typically quite noisy, while it is costly to change production.  Hence firms 
deliberately filter out high-frequency noise in shipments or customer orders so as to avoid 
overreacting to temporary variations.  Such filtering is often accomplished with exponential 
smoothing or other forms of moving averages.  Finally, expected losses might also include 
knowledge of seasonal variations or other factors.  
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The feedback structure of the ordering heuristic is shown in the bottom part of Figure 3.  The 
adjustment for the stock AS creates the balancing (negative) Stock Control feedback loop.  The 
simplest formulation is to assume the adjustment is linear in the discrepancy between the desired 
stock S* and the actual stock: 
  ܣௌ ൌ ሺܵ∗ െ ܵሻ ߬ௌ⁄   (9)  
where S* is the desired stock and ߬ௌ is the stock adjustment time (equivalently, 1/߬ௌ is the 
fraction of the discrepancy between desired and actual inventory ordered per time unit). The 
desired stock may be a constant or a variable. 
The adjustment for the supply line is formulated analogously to the adjustment for the stock: 
  ܣௌ௅ ൌ ሺܵܮ∗ െ ܵܮሻ ߬ௌ௅⁄   (10)  
where SL* is the desired supply line and ߬ௌ௅ is the supply line adjustment time.  The supply line 
adjustment forms the negative Supply Line Control loop.  
Figure 3 does not show the feedback structure for the desired supply line.  In some cases the 
desired supply line is constant.  More often, however, decision makers seek to maintain a 
sufficient number of units on order to achieve the acquisition rate they desire.  By Little’s Law 
the supply line must, in equilibrium, contain ߣ time units worth of the throughput the decision 
maker desires to achieve.  Several measures for desired throughput are common.  The decision 
maker may set the desired supply line to yield the desired acquisition rate, ܣܴ∗: 
  ܵܮ∗ ൌ ߣ௘ ∗ ܣܴ∗  (10a)  
where ߣ௘, the expected acquisition lag, represents the decision maker’s current belief about the 
length of the acquisition delay (which, in general, may differ from the actual acquisition delay).   
Equation (11a) assumes a rather high degree of rationality on the part of decision makers.  
They are assumed to adjust the supply line to achieve the desired acquisition rate, which includes 
replacement of expected losses and correction of temporary gaps between desired and actual 
inventory.  As described below, experimental evidence shows decision makers are often not so 
sophisticated.  Managers frequently do not adjust the supply line in response to temporary 
imbalances in the stock but base the desired supply line on their estimate of long-run throughput 
requirements—the expected loss rate ܮ௘: 
  ܵܮ∗ ൌ ߣ௘ ∗ ܮ௘  (11b)  
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The formulation for the desired supply line should be based on empirical investigation of the 
actual decision-making process (e.g., Senge 1980, Croson et al. 2013, Sterman & Dogan 2014). 
Whichever formulation for the desired supply line is used, the longer the expected delay in 
acquiring goods or the larger the desired throughput rate, the larger the supply line must be.  If a 
retailer wishes to receive 1,000 widgets per week from the supplier and delivery requires six 
weeks, the retailer must have 6,000 widgets on order to ensure an uninterrupted flow of 
deliveries.  The adjustment for the supply line creates a negative feedback loop that adjusts 
orders to maintain the acquisition rate at the desired value given the (expected) delay between 
orders and delivery.  Without the supply line feedback, orders would be placed even after the 
supply line contained sufficient units to correct stock shortfalls, producing overshoot and 
instability.  The supply line adjustment also compensates for changes in the acquisition lag.  If 
the acquisition lag doubled, for example, the supply line adjustment would induce sufficient 
additional orders to restore acquisitions to the desired rate.   
There are many possible ways managers may form the expected acquisition lag ߣ௘ ranging 
from constants through guesstimates to sophisticated forecasts.  Usually, it takes time to detect 
changes in delivery times.  Customers often do not know that goods they ordered will be late 
until after the promised delivery time has passed.  The expected acquisition lag can then be 
modeled by a perception delay representing the time required to observe and respond to changes 
in the actual delay.  For example, Senge (1980) found expected delivery times for capital plant 
and equipment lagged the actual delivery times by 1.3 years for firms in the US economy.   
The formulation for the order rate conforms to core principles for behavioral models 
(Sterman 2000, Ch. 13).  First, the formulation is robust:  Orders remain nonnegative no matter 
how large a surplus stock there may be, and the supply line and stock therefore never fall below 
zero.  Second, information not available to real decision makers is not utilized (such as the 
instantaneous value of the loss rate, or the solution to the dynamic programming problem 
determining the optimal order rate).  Finally, the ordering decision rule is grounded in well-
established knowledge of decision-making behavior, such as the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic.  Expected losses form an easily anticipated and relatively stable starting point for the 
determination of orders.  Loss rate information will typically be locally available and highly 
salient to the decision maker.  Replacing losses will keep the stock constant at its current level.  
Adjustments are then made in response to the adequacy of the stock and supply line.  No 
assumption is made that these adjustments are optimal.  Rather, pressures arising from the 
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discrepancies between desired and actual quantities cause managers to adjust the order rate 
above or below the level that would maintain the status quo.  
The Stock Management Problem: Dynamics 
To illustrate the behavior of the stock management structure, consider how a manufacturing 
firm manages its inventory of product.  Figure 4 adapts the generic stock management structure 
to the case of inventory and production control.  The firm maintains a stock of finished inventory 
and fills orders as they arrive.  In this simple illustration, assume that customers are delivery 
sensitive—orders the company cannot fill immediately are lost as customers seek other sources 
of supply (Sterman 2000, Ch. 18, extends the model to add an explicit backlog of unfilled 
orders).  Production takes time.  The supply line is the stock of work in process inventory (WIP), 
which is increased by production starts and decreased by production.   
The key production control and inventory management decisions are order fulfillment 
(determining the ability to fill customer orders based on the adequacy of inventory) and 
production scheduling (determining the rate of production starts based on the demand forecast 
and inventory position of the firm, including the WIP inventory).  The model includes three 
important negative feedbacks.  The Stockout loop regulates shipments as inventory varies:  If 
inventory is inadequate, some items will be out of stock and shipments fall below orders.  In the 
extreme, shipments must fall to zero when there is no inventory.  The Inventory Control and WIP 
Control loops adjust production starts to move the levels of inventory and WIP toward their 
desired levels.  In this initial model there are no stocks of materials and no capacity constraints 
(either from labor or capital).  These extensions are treated in Sterman 2000, Ch. 18. 
For purposes of illustration, we assume there are no capacity constraints or materials 
shortages that might limit production starts, so the actual production start rate is equal to the 
desired production start rate.  Following the standard stock management structure, desired 
production starts are anchored on desired production, then adjusted to bring the stock of WIP in 
line with the desired WIP level.  Desired production, in turn, is anchored on the Expected Order 
Rate, then adjusted to bring the stock of finished goods inventory in line with the desired level.  
Because incoming customer orders are typically noisy, the firm, as is common, uses first-order 
exponential smoothing to filter out the high-frequency random variations in customer orders.  
The firm seeks to maintain enough finished goods inventory to provide excellent customer 
service, and so seeks to maintain a certain desired number of weeks of inventory coverage.  
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Desired inventory coverage consists of the minimum time required to process and ship orders 
plus safety stock coverage large enough to provide excellent customer service.  The model is 
fully documented in Sterman 2000, Ch. 18.4 
Note that the model does not include the main operational factors that can make 
amplification a rational outcome (Lee et al. 1997).  There are no quantity discounts, so order 
batching is never rational.  Prices are constant, so there is never any incentive to order more 
(less) in the expectation that prices will rise (fall).  Each customer has only one supplier and each 
supplier only one customer, so there is no incentive to place phantom orders. 
Now consider the impact of an unanticipated 20% increase in customer orders, from an initial 
equilibrium with throughput of 10,000 units/week (Figure 5).  
The desired shipment rate rises immediately after the step increase in demand.  Inventory 
coverage immediately drops from its initial value of four weeks to 3.33 weeks.  In the instant 
after the customer order rate jumps, inventory has not yet changed, and the firm is initially able 
to fill nearly all the incoming orders, despite the increase.  However, because production 
continues at the initial rate of 10,000 widgets/week, inventory falls.  As inventory falls, so too 
does the firm’s ability to ship.  A maximum of about 5% of orders go unfilled and are lost 
(along, most likely, with the firm’s reputation as a reliable supplier). 
The growing gap between desired and actual inventory forces desired production to rise 
above expected orders.  As it does the quantity of work in process required to meet the higher 
production goal also grows, opening a gap between the desired and actual level of WIP.  Thus 
the desired production start rate rises further above the desired production rate.   
As time passes the firm recognizes that the initial increase in demand is not a mere random 
blip and gradually raises its demand forecast.  As expected orders rise, so too does desired 
inventory, further increasing the gap between desired and actual inventory and boosting desired 
production still more.  Production starts reach a peak more than 42% above the initial level about 
four weeks after the shock, 210% more than the change in customer orders. 
                                                 
4  The parameters in the simulation in Figure 5 are: 
               Parameter Base Case Value (Weeks) 
 Minimum Order Processing Time 2 
 Safety Stock Coverage 2 
 Manufacturing Cycle Time 8 
 Inventory Adjustment Time 8 
 WIP Adjustment Time 2 
 Time to Average Order Rate 8 
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Figure 4  The stock management structure adapted for a manufacturing firm
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Figure 5  Response of the manufacturing model to a 20% step increase in orders 
 
9
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
1
,
0
0
0
1
2
,
0
0
0
1
3
,
0
0
0
1
4
,
0
0
0
1
5
,
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
Widgets/Week
W
e
e
k
s
S
h
i
p
m
e
n
t
s
D
e
s
i
r
e
d
 
S
h
i
p
m
e
n
t
s
L
o
s
t
 
O
r
d
e
r
s
9
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
1
,
0
0
0
1
2
,
0
0
0
1
3
,
0
0
0
1
4
,
0
0
0
1
5
,
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
Widgets/Week
W
e
e
k
s
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
O
r
d
e
r
s
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
S
t
a
r
t
s
C
u
s
t
o
m
e
r
 
O
r
d
e
r
s
D
e
s
i
r
e
d
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
012345
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
Inventory Coverage
(weeks)
W
e
e
k
s
3
0
,
0
0
0
5
0
,
0
0
0
7
0
,
0
0
0
9
0
,
0
0
0
1
1
0
,
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
Widgets
W
e
e
k
s
W
I
P
D
e
s
i
r
e
d
 
I
n
v
e
n
t
o
r
y
D
e
s
i
r
e
d
W
I
P
I
n
v
e
n
t
o
r
y
 19 
The rapid increase in production starts soon fills the supply line of WIP, but production lags 
behind due to the eight week manufacturing delay.  Production does not surpass shipments until 
more than six weeks have passed; throughout this period inventory continues to fall even as the 
desired inventory level rises.  Inventory stops falling when production first equals shipments.  
The system is not yet in equilibrium, however, because of the large gap between desired and 
actual inventory and between orders and expected orders.  Production eventually rises above 
shipments, causing inventory to rise until it eventually reaches the new, higher desired level.  
Note that the peak of production comes about one-quarter year after the change in orders, much 
longer than the eight-week production delay suggests.   
The consequences of the stock management structure for supply chain management are 
profound.  
1. The process of stock adjustment creates significant amplification.  The initial response 
of the firm to an unanticipated increase in demand is a decline in inventory.  The production 
delay means an initial drop in inventory is inevitable—it is a fundamental consequence of the 
physical structure of the system.  The reduction in inventory contrasts sharply with the firm’s 
desire to hold more inventory when demand increases to maintain acceptable inventory coverage 
and customer service.  
2.  Amplification of the demand shock is unavoidable.  Because inventory must initially 
fall, the only way to increase it back to its initial level and then raise it to the new, higher desired 
level is for production to exceed shipments.  Production must overshoot the shipment rate long 
enough and by a large enough margin to build inventory up to the new desired level.  Production 
starts must overshoot orders even more so that the level of WIP can be built up to a level 
consistent with the higher throughput rate.  
3.  The peak production start rate must lag the change in customer orders.  The 
adjustment to production from the inventory gap reaches its maximum about when the inventory 
reaches its minimum.  Inventory bottoms out only after production has finally risen enough to 
equal shipments, an event that must lag the change in orders.  Like amplification, phase lag is a 
fundamental and inevitable consequence of the physical stock and flow structure. 
4.  Amplification is temporary.  In the long run, a 20% increase in customer orders leads to 
a 20% increase in production starts.  But during the disequilibrium adjustment to the new 
equilibrium, production starts must temporarily rise above orders since that is the only way 
inventory can be rebuilt to its initial level, and the only way inventory and WIP stocks can rise 
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from their initial levels to the new, higher equilibrium levels consistent with higher customer 
demand.   
The firm’s suppliers therefore face much larger changes in demand than the firm itself, and 
much of that surge in demand is temporary.  Upstream firms, such as those supplying plant, 
equipment and materials, will not face a single, permanent change in orders but a much larger, 
and temporary, surge in demand.  Each supplier will, for the same reasons, necessarily amplify 
and delay the change in orders they receive.  As that signal is passed up the supply chain to their 
suppliers, and theirs, the result is the characteristic amplification and phase lag observed in 
commodities, construction, and so many other industries.   
The stock management structure thus explains why supply chains generate amplification and 
phase lag. Given the structure of the system, specifically, production delays and forecast 
adjustment delays, production and production starts must overshoot, amplify, and lag changes in 
demand, no matter how smart the managers of the firm may be.  Amplification and phase lag 
arise even though there is no order batching, no price variations, and no horizontal competition 
among customers for limited supply.  Although those factors may indeed contribute to 
amplification in supply chains, they are not necessary. 
Though amplification and phase lag are inevitable, oscillation is not.  Even though the actors 
use boundedly rational and not optimal decision rules, the response to the demand shock shown 
in Figure 5 is smooth and stable (given the base case parameters).   
C. Case Example 
The simulation above shows how a single link in a supply chain creates amplification and 
phase lag in response to changes in customer demand.  Do people understand why?  
Unfortunately, the answer is no.   To illustrate, Figure 6 shows a simple learning exercise, the 
Manufacturing Case (MC), which assesses people’s understanding of the stock management 
structure in an extremely simple context (Booth Sweeney and Sterman 2000).  
The manufacturing case is an example of a simple stock management task.  Here, a firm 
seeks to control its inventory in the face of an unanticipated step increase in customer demand 
and a lag between a change in the production schedule and the actual production rate, analogous 
to the stock management structure in Figure 4.   
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 Consider a manufacturing firm.  The firm maintains an inventory of finished product.  The firm 
uses this inventory to fill customer orders as they come in.  Historically, orders have averaged 
10,000 units per week.  Because customer orders are quite variable, the firm strives to maintain 
an inventory of 50,000 units to provide excellent customer service (that is, to be able to fill 
essentially 100% of every order), and they adjust production schedules to close any gap 
between the desired and actual level.  Although the firm has ample capacity to handle variations 
in demand, it takes time to adjust the production schedule, and to make the product – a total lag 
of four weeks. 
 
 Now imagine that the order rate for the firm’s products suddenly and unexpectedly rises by 
10%, and remains at the new, higher rate indefinitely, as shown in the graph below.  Before the 
change in demand, production was equal to orders at 10,000 units/week, and inventory was 
equal to the desired level of 50,000 units.  
 
 Sketch the likely path of production and inventory on the graphs below.  Provide an appropriate 
scale for the graph of inventory. 
 
 
 
Figure 6  The Manufacturing Case (Booth Sweeney & Sterman 2000) 
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There is no unique correct answer to the MC task.  However, the trajectories of production 
and inventory must follow certain constraints, and their shapes can be determined without any 
quantitative analysis.  The unanticipated step increase in customer orders means shipments 
increase, while the production delay means production remains, for a time, constant at the 
original rate.  Inventory therefore declines.  The firm must not only boost output to the new rate 
of orders, but also rebuild its inventory to the desired level.  Production must therefore overshoot 
orders and remain above shipments until inventory reaches the desired level, at which point 
production can drop back to equilibrium at the customer order rate.  
Furthermore, since the task specifies that the desired inventory level is constant, the area 
bounded by the production overshoot must equal the quantity of inventory lost during the period 
when orders exceed production, which in turn is the area between orders and production between 
week five and the point where production rises to the order rate. A few modest assumptions 
allow the trajectories of production and inventory to be completely specified.  When customer 
orders increase from 10,000 to 11,000 widgets/week, production remains constant at the initial 
rate, due to the four-week lag.  Inventory, therefore, begins to decline at the rate of 1,000 
widgets/week.  What happens next depends on the distribution of the production lag.  The 
simplest case, and the case most participants assumed, is to assume a pipeline delay, that is,5 
 Production(t) = Desired Production(t – 4).  
Assuming production follows desired production with a four week delay means production 
continues at 10,000 units/week until week nine.  During this time, inventory drops by a total of 
1,000 units/week * 4 weeks = 4,000 units, thus falling to 46,000 units.  Assuming further that the 
firm understands the delay and realizes that production will remain at its original level for four 
weeks, management will raise desired production above orders at week five, keep it above orders 
until an additional 4,000 units are scheduled for production, and then bring desired production 
back down to orders.  Production then traces this pattern four weeks later.  Assuming finally that 
production remains constant during the period of overshoot gives production trajectories such as 
those shown in Figures 7 and 8.  Figure 7, typical of many correct responses, shows production 
rising in week nine to 12,000 units/week and remaining there for the next four weeks, giving a 
rectangle equal in shape to that for the period 5 < t ≤ 9 when shipments exceed production.  Of 
                                                 
5 Other patterns for the delay are possible, such as some adjustment before week nine and some after, and were 
coded as correct as long as production did not begin to increase until after the step increase in orders. 
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course, the production overshoot can have any shape as long as the area equals 4,000 widgets.  
Figure 8 shows an unusual correct response in which the participant shows production rising in 
week nine to 13,000 widgets/week and remaining there for two weeks.  This response clearly 
shows the subject understood the task well.  However, that participant was the only one, out of 
225, who drew a pattern with the duration of the overshoot ≠ 4 weeks while also maintaining the 
correct area relationship. 
 
 
Figure 7  A correct response to the manufacturing case.  Note that the path of inventory is 
consistent with the path of production. 
 
 
Figure 8  An unusual correct response to the manufacturing case 
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It is possible that production and inventory could fluctuate around their equilibrium values, 
but while such fluctuation is not inevitable, the overshoot of production is:  the only way 
inventory can rise is for production to exceed orders, in exactly the same way that the only way 
the level of water in a bathtub can rise is for the flow in from the tap to exceed the flow out 
through the drain.  
The MC Case is quite simple, involving only one stock, one time delay, and one negative 
feedback loop.  Nevertheless, in a group consisting of MBA students, executive MBA students 
and other graduate students at the MIT Sloan School of Management (N = 225), performance 
was poor.  Only 44% of the participants showed production overshooting orders.  Instead, most 
showed production adjusting with a lag to the new customer order rate but not overshooting: they 
failed to understand that building inventory back up to its desired level requires production to 
exceed orders.   
Figure 9 shows typical erroneous responses.  The top panel shows the most common error.  
The participant shows production responding with a lag, but rising up only to the new level of 
orders.  There is no production overshoot.  Further, the trajectory of inventory is inconsistent 
with the production path.  The subject shows inventory falling linearly through about week 10 
(although given the production path as drawn inventory would actually fall at a diminishing 
rate).  Worse, the subject then shows inventory rising even though production equals orders after 
week ten.  
Booth Sweeney and Sterman (2000) explored several variants of the task.  In one, 
participants were asked to sketch the paths for both production and inventory (as in Figure 7).  In 
another, participants were asked only to sketch the trajectory of production (as in Figure 8).  
Booth Sweeney and Sterman hypothesized that requiring participants to draw the path for 
inventory would help them realize the need for production to overshoot customer orders (so as to 
rebuild inventory to the target level).  Overall performance in the inventory graph condition, 
however, was significantly worse than in the no inventory graph condition (t = 5.11, p < 0.0001).  
Only 23% of those in the inventory graph condition correctly showed production overshooting 
orders, compared to 63% of those in the no inventory graph condition.  
Overall, 89% of the participants drew production trajectories that violated conservation of 
material, showing no production overshoot or an overshoot whose area does not equal the area of 
the production undershoot they drew.   The failure to conform to conservation of mass has been 
repeatedly demonstrated in similar experiments with different cover stories, including 
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greenhouse gases accumulating in the atmosphere, receipts, and disbursements accumulating in a 
bank account, and even water filling a bathtub (Sterman & Booth Sweeney 2000, Sterman & 
Booth Sweeney 2007, Sterman 2008, Cronin et al. 2009, Sterman 2010).   
 
 
 
Figure 9  Typical incorrect responses to the Manufacturing Case 
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The experimental evidence shows that many people, including many with extensive training 
in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM), do not understand the most 
basic principles of accumulation.  Inventory control and supply chain management depend 
fundamentally on accumulations:  inventories accumulate production less shipments, backlogs 
accumulate orders less fulfillment and cancellations, and so on.  If people do not understand the 
basic principles of accumulation it should be no surprise that we continue to observe 
dysfunctional dynamics in supply chains across a wide variety of industries and products. 
D. Learning Activity 
The simulation of the stock management structure above explains the origin of amplification 
and phase lag, but does not exhibit oscillations.  How do oscillations arise?  Oscillations can 
arise only when there are time delays in the negative feedbacks controlling the state of the 
system (Sterman 2000, Ch. 4).  The mere existence of a supply line and acquisition lag, however, 
does not necessarily lead to oscillations.  In the manufacturing model above, there is an eight 
week delay between the start and completion of the manufacturing process, yet the system does 
not oscillate (with the estimated parameters).  In that model, managers fully account for the stock 
of WIP—the supply line of units in production but not yet received, and reduce orders as soon as 
they have initiated enough new production to bring inventory up to the desired level even though 
those units have not yet entered the finished goods inventory.   
To oscillate, the time delay must be (at least partially) ignored.  The manager must continue 
to initiate corrective actions in response to the perceived gap between the desired and actual state 
of the system even after sufficient corrections to close the gap are in the pipeline.  But do 
managers ignore these time delays and the supply line of corrective actions?  In many settings, 
shockingly, the answer is yes. 
 
The Beer Distribution Game 
The Beer Distribution Game illustrates how oscillations arise.6  The game is a role-playing 
simulation of a supply chain originally developed by Jay Forrester in the late 1950s to introduce 
students of management to the concepts of system dynamics and computer simulation.  Since 
                                                 
6The game is described in detail in Sterman (1989a, 1992).  Information and materials are available from the System 
Dynamics Society at system.dynamics@albany.edu.  There is no real beer in the beer game and it does not promote 
drinking.  When the game is used with, e.g., high school students, it is easily recast as the “apple juice game.”  Many 
firms have customized the game to represent their industry.   
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then the game has been played all over the world by tens of thousands of people ranging from 
high school students to chief executive officers and senior government officials.  
The game is played on a board portraying a typical supply chain (Figure 10).  Markets and 
chips represent orders for and cases of beer.  Each brewery consists of four sectors: retailer, 
wholesaler, distributor, and factory (R, W, D, F).  One person manages each sector.  A deck of 
cards represents customer demand.  Each week, customers demand beer from the retailer, filling 
the order out of inventory.  The retailer in turn orders beer from the wholesaler, who ships the 
beer requested from wholesale stocks.  Likewise the wholesaler orders and receives beer from 
the distributor, who in turn orders and receives beer from the factory.  The factory produces the 
beer.  At each stage there are order processing and shipping delays.  Each link in the supply 
chain has the same structure.   
The players’ objective is to minimize total costs for their company.  Inventory holding costs 
are typically set to $0.50 per case per week, and stockout costs (costs for having a backlog of 
unfilled orders) to $1.00 per case per week.  The task facing each player is a clear example of the 
stock management problem.  Players must keep their inventories as low as possible while 
avoiding backlogs.  Incoming orders deplete inventory, so players must place replenishment 
orders and adjust their inventories to the desired level.  There is a delay between placing and 
receiving orders, creating a supply line of unfilled orders.  
The standard game is played with a very simple pattern for customer demand.  Starting from 
equilibrium, there is a small, unannounced one-time increase in customer orders, from four to 
eight cases per week.   
The game is far simpler than any real supply chain.  There are no random events—no 
machine breakdowns, transportation problems, or strikes.  There are no capacity constraints or 
financial limitations.  The structure of the game is visible to all.  Players can readily inspect the 
board to see how much inventory is in transit or held by their teammates.   
Further, the main operational factors that can make amplification rational do not apply in the 
beer game:  as in the simulation model in Figures 4-5, the operational factors cited by Lee et al. 
(1997) that may lead to amplification of demand are absent.  There are no quantity discounts that 
could make order batching rational, no price variations that could make forward buying rational, 
and no horizontal competition among customers for limited supply that could make phantom 
ordering or inventory hoarding rational. 
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Figure 10  The Beer Distribution Game 
 
The game is a role-play simulation.  Each player manages one of the links in the distribution chain from Retailer to Factory.  In the 
game, chips of various denominations represent cases of beer and move through the supply chain from Raw Materials to Customers.  
Customer Orders are written on a deck of cards.  Each week players place orders with the supplier on their left and the factory sets the 
production schedule.  The orders, written on slips of paper, move upstream (left to right).  The initial configuration is shown.  
 
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
Production
Requests
Incoming
Orders
Orders
Placed
Production
Delay
Raw
Materials
Used
Order
Cards
Orders Sold
to Customers
WHOLESALER DISTRIBUTOR FACTORY
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
Current
Inventory
Incoming
Orders
Orders
Placed
Incoming
Orders
Orders
Placed
Current
Inventory
RETAILER
Customer
Orders
Production
Delay
Current
Inventory
Current
Inventory
4 4 4 4 4 4 4
 29 
Despite the simplicity of the game, however, people do extremely poorly.  Among first-time 
players average costs are typically an astonishing 10 times greater than optimal (Sterman 1989a).  
Figure 11 shows typical results.  In all cases customer orders are essentially constant (except for 
the small step increase near the start).  In all cases, the response of the supply chain is unstable.  
The oscillation, amplification, and phase lag observed in real supply chains are clearly visible in 
the experimental results.  The period of the cycle is 20-25 weeks.  The average amplification 
ratio of factory production relative to customer orders is a factor of four, and factory production 
peaks some 15 weeks after the change in customer orders.   
Most interesting, the patterns of behavior generated in the game are remarkably similar  
(there are, of course, individual differences in magnitude and timing).  Starting with the retailer, 
inventories decline throughout the supply chain, and most players develop a backlog of unfilled 
orders (net inventory becomes negative).  In response, a wave of orders move through the chain, 
growing larger at each stage.  Eventually, factory production surges, and inventories throughout 
the supply chain start to rise.  But inventory does not stabilize at the cost-minimizing level near 
zero.  Instead, inventory significantly overshoots.  Players respond by slashing orders, often 
cutting them to zero for extended periods.  Inventory eventually peaks and slowly declines.  
These behavioral regularities are all the more remarkable because there is no oscillation in 
customer demand.  The oscillation arises as an endogenous consequence of the way the players 
manage their inventories.  Though players are free to place orders any way they wish, the vast 
majority behave in a remarkably uniform fashion.  
Modeling Managerial Behavior:  Misperceptions of Feedback 
To understand the origin of oscillations more formally, Sterman (1989a) tested the decision 
rule for customer orders described above against the order decisions of players in the game.  
Orders placed are given by the anchoring and adjustment rule used in the stock management 
structure developed above.  Participants are assumed to anchor on their belief about expected 
incoming orders (the loss rate from their inventory), then adjust their orders based on the 
adequacy of their on-hand inventory and supply line of on-order inventory:  
 ܱܴ ൌ	ܯܣܺሺ0, ܦ௘ ൅ ܣௌ ൅ ܣௌ௅ሻ  (12)  
where ܦ௘ is expected demand, that is the participant’s belief about what the next incoming order 
will be.  Sterman (1989a) assumes that expected incoming orders are formed by exponential 
smoothing of customer orders or demand, ܦ, given in discrete time by 
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Figure 11  Typical results of the Beer Distribution Game 
Top:  Orders.  Bottom:  Net inventory (Inventory – Backlog).  Graphs show, bottom to top, Retailer, Wholesaler, Distributor, and 
Factory.  Vertical axis tick marks denote 10 units.  Note the characteristic oscillation, amplification, and phase lag as the change in 
customer orders propagates from retailer to factory.  Source:  Sterman (2000). 
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 ܦ௧௘ ൌ 	ߠܦ௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻܦ௧ିଵ௘  (13)  
where ߠ is the smoothing parameter. 
Clark and Scarf (1960) showed that managers should give as much weight to on-order 
inventory (the supply line, SL) as on-hand inventory (the stock, S).  If so, orders become 
 ܱܴ ൌ	ܯܣܺሺ0, ܦ௘ ൅ ሺሺܵ∗ െ ܵሻ ൅ ሺܵܮ∗ െ ܵܮሻሻ ߬ௌ⁄ ሻ  (14)  
However, participants might not fully account for the supply line of orders placed but not yet 
received.  Even if participants can keep track of the supply line, the supply line is likely to be 
given less weight than on-hand inventory because on-hand inventory is the direct determinant of 
costs, is highly salient, and is right in front of the players, while the supply line has none of these 
attributes.  If participants underweight the supply line, the ordering rule becomes 
  ܱܴ ൌ	ܯܣܺሺ0, ܦ௘ ൅ ൫ሺܵ∗ െ ܵሻ ൅ ߚሺܵܮ∗ െ ܵܮሻ൯ ߬ௌ⁄ ሻ  (15)  
where ߚ ൌ ߬ௌ/߬ௌ௅ is the fraction of the supply line adjustment taken into account:  when people 
underweight or ignore the supply line, SL will be longer than the stock adjustment time; if the 
supply line adjustment is completely ignored, then ߬ௌ௅ → ∞ which implies ܣௌ௅ → 0 (Sterman 
1989a, 2000).  Collecting terms and defining ܵᇱ ൌ 	 ܵ∗ ൅	ߚܵܮ∗	 yields 
 ܱܴ ൌ	ܯܣܺሺ0, ܦ௘ ൅ ሺܵᇱ െ ሺܵ ൅ ߚܵܮሻሻ ߬ௌ⁄ ሻ  (16)  
Assuming that the desired stock and desired supply line are constant and including an 
additive error term yields the system of equations to be estimated: 
 ܱܴ௧ ൌ 	ܯܣܺሺ0, ܦ௧௘ ൅ ߙ൫ܵᇱ െ ሺܵ௧ ൅ ߚܵܮ௧ሻ൯ 	൅	ߝ௧ሻ  (17)  
 ܦ௧௘ ൌ 	ߠܦ௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻܦ௧ିଵ௘  (18)  
where ߙ = 1/߬ௌ is the fraction of the perceived inventory discrepancy ordered each week.  There 
are four parameters to be estimated:  the forecast updating time, 0 ≤	ߠ ≤ 1; the fraction of the 
perceived inventory discrepancy ordered each week, 0 ≤	ߙ ≤ 1; the fraction of the supply line of 
unfilled orders taken into account, 0 ≤	ߚ ≤ 1; and the desired stock of on-hand and on-order 
inventory, 0 ≤ ܵᇱ. 
Sterman (1989a) estimated eq. (17-18) by nonlinear least squares for a sample of 44 players.  
Overall, the decision rule worked quite well, explaining 71% of the variance in the order 
decisions of the participants.  The estimated parameters showed that most were using grossly 
suboptimal cue weights.  The average weight on the supply line was only 0.34.  Only 25% of the 
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participants considered more than half the supply line and the estimated value of ߚ was not 
significantly different from zero for fully one-third.  To illustrate, Figure 12 compares simulated 
and actual behavior for the factory in an actual game.  The estimated fraction of the inventory 
discrepancy ordered each week is 0.8—the player reacted aggressively to inventory shortfalls, 
ordering nearly the entire inventory shortfall each week.  At the same time, the estimated fraction 
of the supply line taken into account is zero—this participant completely ignored the supply line 
of orders placed but not yet received.  As you would expect, aggressively reacting to current 
inventory shortfalls while completely ignoring the supply line leads to severe instability and high 
costs.  Because it takes three weeks to receive production requested today, the player effectively 
orders almost three times more than needed to correct any inventory shortfall. 
 
 
 
Figure 12  Estimated vs. actual behavior in the beer game 
Parameters: ߠ  = 0.55, ܵᇱ ൌ 9, ߙ = 0.80, ߚ = 0.  Source:  Sterman (1989a). 
 
Other experiments with the beer game and similar stock management systems (for example, 
Sterman 1989b; Diehl &Sterman 1995; Brehmer 1992, Paich & Sterman 1993, Kampmann and 
Sterman 2013, Croson & Donohue 2006, Croson et al. 2013) show that the tendency to ignore 
time delays and underweight the supply line is robust.  In many of these experiments the supply 
line was prominently displayed to the participants, yet they ignored it anyway.  The information 
we use in decision-making is conditioned by our mental models.  If we don’t recognize the 
presence of a time delay or underestimate its length, we are unlikely to account for the supply 
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line even if the information needed to do so is readily available.   
Many players find these results disturbing.  They argue that they took a wide range of 
information into account when placing orders and that their subtle and sophisticated reasoning 
cannot be captured by a model as simple as the anchoring and adjustment decision rule described 
here.  After all, the decision rule for orders only considers three cues (incoming orders, 
inventory, and the supply line)—how could it possibly capture the way people place orders?  
Actually, players’ behavior is highly systematic and is explained well by the simple stock 
management heuristic, and furthermore, the cue weights people tend to use are grossly 
suboptimal and lead to very poor performance, including the oscillation, amplification and phase 
lag seen in both the game and in real supply chains.  People are often surprised how well simple 
decision rules can mimic their behavior. 
In fact, one of the games shown in Figure 11 is a simulation, not the actual play of real 
people.  The simulation uses the decision rule in equations (17-18), with the parameters, for all 
four players, set to the average estimated values over the full sample in Sterman (1989a).  A 
small amount of random noise was added to the order rate.  Can you tell which is the 
simulation?7 
E. Discussion 
Recognizing and Accounting for Time Delays 
The beer game clearly shows it is folly to ignore the time delays in complex systems.  
Consider the following situation:  You are involved in an automobile accident.  Thankfully, no 
one is hurt, but your car is a total loss.  Insurance settlement in hand, you visit a dealer and select 
a new car.  You agree on a price, but the model you want is not in stock—delivery will take four 
weeks.  You pay your deposit and leave.  The next morning, noticing that your driveway is 
empty—Where’s my car!—you go down to the dealer and buy another one.  Ridiculous, of 
course.  No one would be so foolish as to ignore the supply line.  Yet in many real life situations 
people do exactly that.  Consider the following examples (Table 1 shows how they map into the 
stock management structure): 
• You cook on an electric range.  To get dinner going as soon as possible, you set the 
burner under your pan to “high.”  After a while you notice the pan is getting quite hot, so 
                                                 
7Simulated orders were generated by eq. (17-18) with  = 0.36, ܵᇱ = 17 units,  = 0.26/week, and  = 0.34.  The 
error term was iid normal with mean zero and standard deviation set to the average of the standard errors of the 
estimated order equation over the full sample. 
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you turn the heat down.  But the supply line of heat in the glowing coil continues to heat 
the pan even after the current is cut, and your dinner is burned anyway.   
• You are surfing the worldwide web.  Your computer did not respond to your last click.  
You click again, then again.  Growing impatient, you click on other buttons—any 
buttons—to see if you can get a response.  After a few seconds, the system executes all 
the clicks you stacked up in the supply line, and you end up far from the page you were 
seeking.  
• You arrive late and tired to an unfamiliar hotel.  You turn on the shower, but the water is 
freezing.  You turn up the hot water.  Still cold.  You turn the hot up some more.  Ahhh.  
Just right.  You step in.  A second later you jump out screaming, scalded by the now too-
hot water.  Cursing, you realize that once again, you’ve ignored the time delay for the hot 
water to get to your shower. 
• You are driving on a busy highway.  The car in front of you slows slightly.  You take 
your foot of the gas, but the distance to the car in front keeps shrinking.  Your reaction 
time and the momentum of your car create a delay between a change in the speed of the 
car ahead and a change in your speed.  To avoid a collision, you have to slam on the 
brakes. The car behind you is forced to brake even harder.  You hear the screech of 
rubber and pray you won’t be rear-ended. 
• You are young, and experimenting with alcohol for the first time.  Eager to show your 
friends you can hold your liquor, you quickly drain your glass.  You feel fine.  You drink 
another.  Still feeling fine.  You take another and another.  As consciousness fades and 
you fall to the floor, you realize—too late—that you ignored the supply line of alcohol in 
your stomach and drank far too much.8 
How often you have fallen victim to one of these behaviors?  Few of us can say we’ve never 
burned our dinner or been scalded in the shower, never drunk too much or been forced to brake 
hard to avoid a collision. 
Recognizing and accounting for time delays is not innate.  It is behavior we must learn.  
When we are born, our awareness is limited to our immediate surroundings.  Everything we 
experience is here and now.  All our early experiences reinforce the belief that cause and effect 
are closely related in time and space:  When you cry, you get fed or changed.  You keep crying 
until mother or father appears, even when you hear your parents say, “We’re coming” (i.e., 
despite knowledge that your request for attention is in the supply line).  As all parents know, it 
takes years for children to learn to account for such time delays.  When my son was two he might 
ask for a cup of juice:  “Juice please, Daddy.”  “Coming right up,” I’d say, taking a cup from the 
shelf.  Though he could see me getting the cup and filling it up, he’d continue to say, “Juice, 
Daddy!” many times—ever more insistently—until the cup was actually in his hand.   
                                                 
8Tragically, young people die every year from alcohol poisoning induced by aggressive drinking (a short stock 
adjustment time, ߬ௌ, and failure to account for the supply line of alcohol they’ve already ingested,  ≈ 0). 
 35 
Learning to recognize and account for time delays goes hand in hand with learning to be 
patient, to defer gratification, and to bear short-run sacrifice for long-term reward.  These 
abilities do not develop automatically.  They are part of a slow process of maturation.  The 
longer the time delays and the greater the uncertainty over how long it will take to see the results 
of your corrective actions, the harder it is to account for the supply line.9   
You might argue that by the time we become adults we have developed the requisite patience 
and sensitivity to time delays.  There may be no cost to saying “juice” a dozen times, but surely 
when the stakes are high we would quickly learn to consider delays.  You don’t burn yourself in 
your own shower at home—you’ve learned where to set the hot water faucet to get the 
temperature you like and to wait long enough for the water to warm up.  Most people learn to 
pay attention to the supply line of alcohol in their system and moderate their drinking.  The 
conditions for learning in these systems are excellent.  Feedback is swift, and the consequences 
of error are highly salient (particularly the morning after).  There is no doubt in either case that it 
was the way you made decisions—the way you set the faucet or drank too fast—that caused the 
problem.  These conditions are frequently not met in business, economic, environmental, and 
other real world systems.  In the real world, cause and effect are obscure, creating ambiguity and 
uncertainty.  The dynamics are much slower, and the time required for learning often exceeds the 
tenure of individual decision makers.   
The French economist Albert Aftalion recognized in the early 1900s how failure to account 
for the time delays could cause economic cycles.  Using the familiar fireplace as an analogy, his 
description explicitly focuses on the failure of decision makers to pay attention to the supply line 
of fuel: 
If one rekindles the fire in the hearth in order to warm up a room, one has to wait a while 
before one has the desired temperature.  As the cold continues, and the thermometer 
continues to record it, one might be led, if one had not the lessons of experience, to throw 
more coal on the fire.  One would continue to throw coal, even though the quantity 
already in the grate is such as will give off an intolerable heat, when once it is all alight.  
To allow oneself to be guided by the present sense of cold and the indications of the 
thermometer to that effect is fatally to overheat the room.10 
                                                 
9More subtly, our childhood experiences reinforce the idea that there is no cost to ignoring the supply line.  Though 
my son may have said “Juice, Daddy” 10 times before I could fill his order, I brought him only one cup.  He didn’t 
take the supply line into account, but I did.  In that situation, there is no cost to over-ordering, while patience might 
not work (dad might get distracted and forget to bring the juice).  In many real stock management situations, there is 
no central authority to account for the time delays and prevent over-ordering. 
10Quoted in Haberler, G. (1964) Prosperity and Depression.  London:  George Allen and Unwin, pp. 135–136. 
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While Aftalion argued that “the lessons of experience” would soon teach people not to 
“continue to throw coal,” he argued that business cycles in the economy arose because individual 
entrepreneurs focused only on current profitability and failed to account for the lags between the 
initiation of new investment and its realization, leading to collective overproduction.   
Yet even if individuals can’t learn effectively, shouldn’t the discipline imposed by the market 
quickly weed out people who use suboptimal decision rules?  Those who ignore the supply line 
or use poor decision rules should lose money and go out of business or be fired, while those who 
use superior decision rules, even by chance, should prosper.  The selective pressures of the 
market should quickly lead to the evolution of optimal decision rules.  
The persistent cycles in a wide range of supply chains presented at the start of this chapter 
suggest Aftalion was right.  Learning and evolution in real markets appear to be slow, at best, 
despite decades of experience and the huge sums at stake, as illustrated by the persistence of 
business cycles and speculative bubbles such as the bubble in housing construction in the early 
2000s that culminated in the financial crisis of 2008 and the so-called “Great Recession.”  People 
tend to discount the experience of prior decades as irrelevant, arguing that the world has changed 
since the last crisis.  Additionally, individual firms usually do not ignore the supply lines of 
materials on order or capital under construction.  The problem is one of aggregation.  The 
individual firm tends to view itself as small relative to the market and treats the environment as 
exogenous, thereby ignoring all feedbacks from prices to supply and demand.  The individual 
firm may not know or give sufficient weight to the supply lines of all firms in the industry or the 
total capacity of all plants under construction.  Firms tend to continue to invest and expand as 
long as profits are high today, even after the supply line of new capacity under construction is 
more than sufficient to cause a glut and destroy profitability.  Each investor takes market 
conditions as exogenous, ignoring the reactions of others.  When all investors react similarly to 
current profit opportunities, the result is overshoot and instability.   
F.  Summary 
Supply chains are fundamental to a wide range of systems and many exhibit persistent 
instability and oscillation.  Every supply chain consists of stocks and the management policies 
used to manage them.  These management policies are designed to keep the stocks at their target 
levels, compensating for usage or loss and for unanticipated disturbances in the environment.  
Often there are important delays between the initiation of a control action and the result, creating 
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a supply line of unfilled orders.   
This chapter developed a generic model of the stock management structure and showed how 
it can be customized to various situations.  The model explains the sources of oscillation, 
amplification, and phase lag observed in supply chains.  These patterns of behavior are 
fundamental to the basic physical structure of stock management systems and supply chains.  
Oscillation arises from the combination of time delays in negative feedbacks and failure of the 
decision maker to take the time delays into account.  Field and experimental studies show that 
people often ignore the time delays in a wide range of systems. 
There is no one single cause for the failure to account for time delays and the supply line.  A 
range of factors, from information availability to individual incentives, all contribute.  But 
behind these apparent causes lies a deeper problem.  True, the supply line is often inadequately 
measured, but if people understood the importance of the supply line they would invest in data 
collection and measurement systems to provide the needed information.  True, compensation 
incentives often encourage people to ignore the delayed consequences of today’s actions, but if 
investors understood the structure and dynamics of the market they could redesign compensation 
incentives for their agents to focus on long-term performance.  Our mental models affect the 
design of our institutions, information systems, and incentive schemes.  These, in turn, feed back 
to our mental models.  The failure to account for the supply line reflects deeper defects in our 
understanding of complex systems.  Ignoring time delays is one of the fundamental 
misperceptions of feedback that leads to poor performance in systems with high dynamic 
complexity.  Failure to understand the role of time delays worsens the instability we face and 
leads to more unpleasant surprises, reinforcing the belief that the world is inherently capricious 
and unpredictable and strengthening the short-term focus still more.  
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